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Abstract (100 words approx) 
John of the Cross presents a spiritual journey of desire in which desire changes from a painful 
yearning for an infinite other, always out of reach (human desire), to the satisfaction of desire 
in mutual love and rest (the goal of union with God, conforming human to divine desire).  
John asserts a continuity of desire between these two states, and that it is possible for human 
desire to grow from one into the other.  Yet they are very different.  John’s treatment of 





In many respects, John of the Cross reiterates the standard Neoplatonic approach to desire 
taken up by Christians such as Augustine and others in the Christian Neoplatonic tradition.  
As Talbot Brewer has noted, this tradition of thinking about desire, which is not significantly 
challenged until the modern period, relates all human desire to a fundamental longing for 
God, which ‘takes very different and progressively less illusory forms’ in the course of the 
spiritual life.  Desire is a life quest, told in personal terms, with successive articulations which 
aim to reach a more adequate conception of the ultimate good which is God.1  Brewer points 
out that Augustine in his Confessions claims that in early life he pursued this desire in ‘sex, 
aesthetic pleasure, philosophic insight, public honour, purely worldly friendship, and other 
ends’, only later realising that it was more adequately directed towards God.  In retrospect, 
Augustine regards his earlier pursuits as ‘unsatisfying displacements’ of a desire whose real 
nature was at that stage ‘opaque to, or at least unacknowledged by, its possessor’.2  In the 
Christian conception, as compared with non-Christian Neoplatonic accounts (such as 
Plotinus), this illusory character of the desire, which is gradually dismantled in the process of 
spiritual growth, is especially important because of the additional emphasis placed on sin, 
according to which the desire for God inevitably goes wrong without the saving action of 
                                                 
1 Talbot Brewer, ‘Three Dogmas of Desire’, in Timothy Chappell, ed., Values and Virtues: Aristotelianism in 
Contemporary Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 270. 
2 Ibid., p. 269. 
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Jesus Christ.  For Augustine, desire for God is universally present but it is pathologically 
flawed, leading astray until it is deliberately surrendered to God by the individual in 
conversion.  There is then a particular challenge in grasping what this desire is and how it is 
to be pursued, which is a work of undeception, requiring grace.  How human desire is desire 
for God, when it is construed antagonistically in relation to God, requires finding something 
hidden in desire which is obscured by its initial manifestations. 
 
John of the Cross distinguishes between desire in its deceptive and true forms in a way that is 
recognisably part of this Augustinian tradition.  There is a process of transformation in which 
the nature of desire and the desirer’s perception changes.  At some points, the change is so 
great that the desire feels as if it is being lost or, conversely, feels unbearable in its 
contradictions.  The question for John is how to identify true desire in these hostile 
conditions.  When the desire for God feels, alternately, like pain, pleasure and nothing at all, 
a means is needed to uncover its hidden reality.  God is hidden as ontologically other than 
creatures, which removes any clear correspondence between God and creatures as objects of 
desire, and by the sinful tendency of desire to substitute created objects for God, even though 
they do not satisfy.  The means is then both to detach the desire from objects in creation, and 
to receive the divine revelation of God’s desire in the incarnation, which, John claims, reveals 
a meeting point in human experience between human desire for God and God’s desire for 
creatures (divine desire).  Without this theological continuity of human and divine, he 
suggests, human desires, even when directed towards God, are irreconcilably diverse and 
frustrating.  The reason for thinking that human desires are, at root, a single desire, is that 
they participate in a single desire which is divine, but this only becomes known with the help 
of the saving grace of the incarnation.   
 
In approaching these questions, John provides an original perspective that departs from 
Augustine’s account in his emphasis that the continuity that we seek can be intelligibly 
recognised as desire in this life.  For Augustine, human desire and divine desire remain more 
antagonistically construed, not reaching this meeting point in experience.  John is more 
optimistic, pursuing desire for God not just through this phase of antagonism, but as capable 
of uniting with divine desire in the state of ‘union with God’ – a goal which is possible in this 
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life, rather than waiting for heaven as for Augustine.3  This difference is partly explained by 
the influence of Dionysius, who adds another element from the Christian Neoplatonic 
tradition of desire, namely the identification of the saving action of Christ with the presence 
in creation of divine eros or desirous love.4  Then, in a further step, John develops this link 
between divine eros and human desire using the medieval commentary tradition on the Song 
of Songs, seeing the process of engagement between divine and human desire as like the 
growth of passionate love between the lovers in the text, leading to the consummation of 
desire in union or spiritual marriage. 5  Human desire reaches its goal in a desire which is 
mutual between the individual and God, a claim which John justifies with reference to the 
love bond of divine eros (the Holy Spirit) that is between the Father and the Son in the 
Trinity, where desire is mutual in character, and in which humanity shares through the 
hypostatic union of human and divine in Christ.6 
 
In the course of this analysis, John addresses vital issues concerning the nature of desire.  
First, he contrasts merely appetitive desire, exemplified by the human appetites such as 
hunger for food, with the desire for God, while also seeking to show that these two kinds of 
desire ultimately lose their antagonism through the meeting of human and divine desire in 
union, while remaining distinct.  Second, having contrasted the two kinds of desire – not least 
in terms of satisfaction, saying that the desire for God is marked out by the fact that it cannot 
be satisfied, even temporarily – he later asserts that the desire for God brings a greater 
satisfaction, though of different kind, without an end to desire.  These two points, though 
                                                 
3 See William S. Babcock, ‘Augustine and the Spirituality of Desire’, Augustinian Studies 25 (1994): 179-199.  
Babcock argues that desire in Augustine is ‘an active exercise that serves to expand the capacity of the self and 
make it capable (capax) of the vision it awaits’ (190).  But in contrast to John, the vision is awaited, rather than 
already present (other than in brief flashes on which Augustine does not dwell), and consequently how it 
becomes human desire is not spelled out. 
4 Dionysius, Divine Names 4, esp. 4.10-17 (708A-713D); Bernard McGinn, Mysticism in the Golden Age of 
Spain: the Presence of God, vol. 6.2 (New York: Herder & Herder Crossroad, 2017), p. 249.   
5 John’s positive view of eros follows Dionysius as well as the tradition of commentary on the Song of Songs 
begun by Origen and represented at its height by Bernard of Clairvaux’s Sermons on the Song of Songs (1135-
53).  Contrast its more recent denigration by Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros: a History of the Christian Idea of 
Love, 2 vols (London: SPCK, 1937-38). 
6 John of the Cross, C 13.11 (and see my comments on this pivotal passage below); C 39.3; F 3.79; 4.16-17.  
John of the Cross’ works are abbreviated as follows: 
 A Ascent of Mount Carmel 
 N Dark Night 
 C Spiritual Canticle (B redaction) 
 F Living Flame of Love (B redaction) 
The edition used is The Collected Works of John of the Cross, trans. and intro. Kieran Kavanaugh and Otilio 
Rodriguez (Washington D.C.: Institute of Carmelite Studies, 1979); for the Spanish original see Obras 
Completas de San Juan de la Cruz, ed. Lucinio Ruano, 14th ed. (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 
1994).  Where Spanish words are quoted, the page number from this edition follows that of the English edition. 
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distinctively handled by John, are also to be found in others in the Christian Neoplatonic 
tradition, but a third is more original.7  John is concerned to show that human desire unites 
with God’s desire without eliminating the element of lack that remains even when human 
desire is transformed.  Human desire continues to be lacking in relation to the perfection and 
infinitude of God, but it takes a form that is compatible with the divine abundance.  Desire is 
transformed so that that it is defined by divine abundance, but human lack is included without 
doing violence to it, becoming part of this transformed desire. 
 
The emergence of desire8 
John begins from a low view of human capacity in relation to God, on account of the Fall and 
sin.  Fallen desire seeks sensory gratification in preference to God.  In the Ascent of Mount 
Carmel, John deals with the outward ascetic response to this problem relatively quickly in 
Book 1, in terms of the purification of the sensory appetites.  He is more concerned with the 
inward roots of the problem, in the way that the fallen human spirit tries to reduce God to 
finite mental images, that is, to make God into a creature, which he treats at greater length in 
Books 2 and 3.  In both the Ascent of Mount Carmel and the Dark Night of the Soul, which 
share a single structure, he focuses on the spiritual problem of what he calls the 
‘disproportion’ between created things and God as creator.9  While the mental faculties of 
intellect, memory and will can relate to created objects naturally, when they seek God it is not 
obvious what kind of relationship is required.  As made in the image of God, the soul desires 
God naturally, but as Talbot Brewer noted in the case of Augustine, the nature of the desire is 
inchoate and hidden.  John thinks that this requires a purgative process in which the mind is 
emptied of the mental images and forms of created things, according to the scholastic dictum 
that ‘two contraries cannot coexist in the same subject’.10  In fact, as he makes clear 
elsewhere, the mind cannot literally be emptied of its knowledge of creatures; rather, we are 
concerned with the ordering of the mind such that its operation in relation to created objects 
                                                 
7 The notion that there is a new kind of satisfaction in endless desire is most strongly associated with Gregory of 
Nyssa, though also present in some others; and the way that human desires are included in divine desire in 
union, losing their former antagonism, is also to be found in Bernard of Clairvaux’s treatment of union, for 
instance.  
8 There are few treatments specifically of desire in John of the Cross.  I have found two unpublished works 
useful: Samuel Hole, Desire, Transformation and Selfhood in John of the Cross (University of Cambridge PhD 
Dissertation, 2016); and Mark Aloysius, SJ, Does Desire Divide or Unify the Self in the Journey of Mystical 
Transformation in the Spiritual Canticle of John of the Cross? (Heythrop College, University of London MTh 
Dissertation, 2017). 
9 e.g., 2A 8:2-3; 11:3; 3A 12.1. 
10 1A 4:2, p. 78. 
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does not obstruct the deeper, more hidden relation that the mind has with God.11  It is a matter 
of shifting attention so that God’s presence can emerge into awareness.  John calls this 
inward growth of awareness a ‘dark inflow’ – dark according to Dionysius’ notion of God as 
a super-sensible ‘ray of darkness’, that is, without the features of created objects, yet utterly 
present.12 
 
The Ascent of Mount Carmel dwells on this process of purgation.  John gives an example 
from the process of spiritual direction, which he regards as typical though not normative (the 
transition is normative, but there are also other ways of going through it).  The spiritual 
director is faced at this stage with individuals who report that that they no longer feel the 
same desire for God.  John says that they can have the feeling of ‘not being satisfied with 
anything’ and even of ‘distaste for the things of God’.  They may feel unable to continue with 
their spiritual exercises, because of a sense of being ‘lost’ and ‘powerless’.13  Bad directors 
seek to play down these experiences, by ordering souls to greater efforts in their exercises, 
implying that it is their fault for not trying hard enough.14  But in fact, correctly discerned, 
this is a moment of grace, in which ‘God transfers his goods and strength from sense to 
spirit’.15  These souls mistakenly identify the warm feelings that they have previously had in 
spiritual exercises with God’s actual presence, and when these disappear, they think that they 
have lost God.  But they are just losing their ‘spiritual sweet tooth’, John says.16  God is 
beginning to communicate with the soul ‘by an act of simple contemplation, in which there is 
no discursive succession of thought’.17 
 
The important feature to note is that beneath the feeling of loss, John is pointing to a more 
authentic, hidden desire that is growing, recognisable not in warm feelings but in the 
continuing desire to seek God ‘solicitously and with painful care’.18  This is the beginning of 
John’s ‘dark nights’.  The way to progress is to concede that the divine object will feel, at this 
stage and before further transformation, like ‘nothing’.  It is not that either God or the desire 
actually is nothing, but rather that the mind’s awareness has not caught up with the character 
                                                 
11 C 26.16. 
12 2A 6; 8.6; 2N 5.3; C 14/15.16; F 3.49. 
13 1N 9.2-3, p. 313; A Prol. 4, p. 71. 
14 A Prol. 4-5; F 2.30-62. 
15 1N 9.4, p. 314. 
16 2A 6.5, p. 122; 2A 7.11; A Prol. 8. 
17 1N 9.8, p. 315. 
18 1N 9.3, p. 314. 
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of the desire as greater than any particular feeling, interpreting it as nothing out of 
unfamiliarity.  What appears as ‘nothing’ must then be treated as something: this ‘nothing’ is 
to be consciously sought.  As he puts it early in the Ascent, ‘To reach satisfaction in all, 
desire (quieras) its possession in nothing (nada)/ To come to possess all, desire the 
possession of nothing/ To arrive at being all, desire to be nothing/ To come to the knowledge 
of all, desire the knowledge of nothing . . . .’19  Every known feeling of desire is to be denied 
but, notably, desire continues: by desiring ‘nothing’, John means allowing that one could 
desire something that is not yet known, and in a way not yet known, but which will become 
known increasingly. 
 
Three initial distinctions of desire have been made.  First, desire for creatures and desire for 
God are distinguished not as competing but as showing their difference by their 
incompatibility.  The difference is marked by an apparent loss of desire, which turns out only 
to be the loss of the first kind of desire, not of desire entirely.  Second, the way to recognise 
this new desire is to look initially at where desire is lost, in the expectation that the new 
desire will emerge gradually, in the space that has been made.  Third, in answer as to why 
this negation of desire should be identified with desire for God, John’s response is that the 
difference between God and creatures is so great that the two desires cannot be simply 
compared.  We can say that we experience both as desire, but what they have in common is 
not available to observation at the merely creaturely level, and will take time and grace to 
emerge. 
 
In the Ascent and Night, the feelings of loss and disorientation dominate.  The ‘dark nights’ 
mark the shift, through this loss, to the discovery of authentic desire for God.  There is some 
valuable material on John’s psychology and anthropology in these works, but for reasons of 
space I shall move directly to John’s later work, the Spiritual Canticle, which provides a 
fuller treatment of desire, moving beyond the stage of loss to the growth of desire and its 
meeting with divine desire in the state of union.20  The Living Flame of Love covers much of 
the same territory, but it is shorter, lacking some of the Canticle’s significant transitions, and 
the focus will therefore be on the Canticle. 
   
                                                 
19 1A 13.11, pp. 103-4; see John’s diagram, pp. 66-67. 
20 For an account of John’s anthropology, see Edward Howells, John of the Cross and Teresa of Avila: Mystical 
Knowing and Selfhood (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 2002), pp. 9-59. 
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The Canticle begins by taking up the experience of desire for God as ‘nothing’ from the 
Ascent, but the story has moved on, in that the desire is more positively felt, while only its 
object is obscure.  The Canticle poem (on which the work is based, taking the form of a 
commentary on the poem) begins, ‘Where have you hidden, Beloved, and left me moaning?’.  
God feels absent, but as one who has departed, leaving the soul ‘moaning’ with desire, rather 
than simply as ‘nothing’.  God still seems ‘far off and hidden’.  The desire is inchoate and 
troubling in its lack of a clear object.  The soul is aware that the desire cannot be satisfied by 
turning back to creatures.21  Only death and the next life then seem to offer the promise of 
satisfaction.22  John refuses this conclusion, however, turning to what it means to be created 
in the image of God.  God is to be found within, he says, both as God (‘by essence’), and 
personally, as Father, Son and Holy Spirit—not absent, therefore, but merely ‘hidden’.23  He 
returns to the non-creaturely nature of God, which requires faith, hope and love as ‘blind 
man’s guides’ to lead through the darkness to the divine object.  Faith recognises that God is 
‘higher and deeper than anything you can reach’, beyond the grasp of the natural intellect.24  
Hope and love affirm that satisfaction does not lie ‘in the possession of things, but in being 
stripped of them all in poverty of spirit’.25  Yet at this point, the most that can be said is that 
the desire is not for creatures; that it is to be pursued by turning away from creatures, in 
which faith, hope and love are the guide; and that the object is situated not outwardly but 
‘within’.  Its more positive nature is still to emerge. 
 
Looking forward, John says that the soul’s desire is now inflamed by a ‘fire’ that drives it to 
‘go out of itself’, which ‘wholly renews it, and changes its manner of being’, like the phoenix 
which rises from the ashes.26  A personal transformation is implied, in other words, by this 
shift from desire’s focus on created objects to the hidden divine object, requiring a new 
‘inward’ way of desiring.  The new ‘desires (deseos), affections (afectos) and moanings 
(gemidos)’ then serve to show what is in the soul’s heart, pointing to the way that the desire is 
rooted in the soul’s being rather than belonging to objects outside.27  Again John contrasts the 
                                                 
21 C 1.1, p. 416. 
22 C 1.4, p. 417. 
23 C 1.8-9, p. 419. 
24 C 1.11-13, p. 420. 
25 C 1.14, p. 421; 2.6-7. 
26 C 1.17, p. 422. 
27 C 2.1, p. 425/750.  John has a wide range of words associated with desire: apetitos (appetites), pasiones 
(passions), afectos (affections), ansias (longings), gemidos (moanings), gustos (pleasures), querer (want, wish), 
amor (love), and desire itself (desear/deseo).  A similar list is given, e.g., by Bernard McGinn, Mysticism in the 
Golden Age of Spain: the Presence of God, vol. 6.2 (New York: Herder & Herder Crossroad, 2017), p. 257. 
8 
 
desire with the desire for creatures: desire for the things of creation will only ‘increase her 
desire (ansias) and suffering rather than bring satisfaction (satisfacen)’.28  The new desire is 
differently constituted.  But how?  The soul cries, 
It seems you are about to give me the jewel of possessing you; but when I become 
aware of this possession, I discover that I do not have it. . . . Now wholly surrender 
yourself by giving yourself entirely to all of me, that my entire soul may have 
complete possession of you.29 
The problem is that whenever the soul tries to pinpoint what it is that she desires, she 
identifies a created type of object which cannot be God.  She cannot yet understand the 
desire.  In consequence, she experiences deep frustration: she feels she is ‘dying of love’.30 
 
The pain is of yearning to possess what is desired, while not knowing any other way of 
satisfying the desire than in an external (that is, created) object, which is not what she wants.  
Looking more closely at the desire, she recognises that it gives life, in spite of the pain: this 
‘love, in killing her, makes her live the life of love’.31  Her awareness of the desire is growing 
through this ‘death’, for ‘she dies the more in growing aware that she does not wholly die of 
love’.32  She has progressed in recognising that the desire puts her in contact with what she 
desires, even though she cannot grasp it.  She ‘lives through love in the object of her love’.33  
This, John says, is to discover that ‘the image of her Bridegroom’ resides within, offering a 
‘sketch’ of God’s presence, through which she can at least move towards the object of her 
desire, a sketch of her goal ‘into which the soul desires to be transfigured through love’.34 
 
This realisation frees the desire to grow without obstruction, having grasped the different 
orientation of the desire, if not its object.  It moves out ecstatically towards God in an 
unlimited movement: she feels ‘like one suspended in the air with nothing to lean on’.35  ‘She 
is rushing toward God as impetuously as a falling stone’, and she ‘calls out to the one who 
did this sketch to finish the painting and image’.36  The desire takes her in an ecstasy towards 
God but it is also tracked by the inward awareness that this is a movement towards the soul’s 
                                                 
28 C 1.2, p. 436/762. 
29 C 6.6, p. 437. 
30 C 7.1, p. 438. 
31 C 7.4, p. 438. 
32 C 7.4, p. 439. 
33 C 8.3, p. 441. 
34 C 11.12, p. 453. 
35 C 9.6, p. 444. 
36 C 12.1, p. 453. 
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completion, like a sketch that is being turned into a finished painting.  However, at this stage, 
the ecstatic movement, whose force is now intense, feels as if it will divide the soul and 
destroy it.  ‘It is incredible how ardent the longing and pain is that the soul experiences,’ John 
says.37  The problem is that while she understands the desire better, she can also ‘understand 
more clearly the infinitude that remains to be understood’.38  How can she ever reach the goal 
for which she longs, when God is infinite?  The reflection plunges the soul into despair.  Will 
the desire simply go on increasing until she is torn apart, between the divine object and the 
embodied constitution of her soul?  John says, ‘the torment she experiences at the time of this 
visit and the terror arising from her awareness of being treated in this supernatural way make 
her cry: “Withdraw them, Beloved . . . !”’39  She asks God to withdraw.  She fears that the 
desire will tear her soul from her body, since it ‘causes her to go out of her senses’ and is 
‘beyond what the sensory part can endure’.40 
 
At this point, it becomes clear that the problem is with the soul’s conception of desire as 
based on human lack rather than on the divine abundance.  She thinks that her desire for an 
infinite other implies that there is an infinite lack within her to be filled.  This is highly 
threatening, for she cannot reconcile her infinite lack with her finitude.  John says, ‘The 
misery of human existence is such that when the communication and knowledge of the 
Beloved, which gives more life to the soul and for which she longs so ardently, is about to be 
imparted, she cannot receive it save almost at the cost of her life’.41  What the soul does not 
yet know is that her finite desire can participate in divine desire in such a way that she 
possesses God in the union of love, without threat to her humanity.  John thinks that in her 
fallen state she has lost this knowledge of the continuity between human and divine desire, 
requiring the incarnation to make it known.  This is his cue for introducing the incarnation.  
Without this divine act, the soul’s desire for God, though she now knows it to be the source 
of her life, is so threatening to her natural existence that she would rather it were removed 
than continue to pursue it in her human weakness.42   
 
In the Spiritual Canticle, the vital transition of desire occurs in Stanza 13.  Once the soul has 
asked the divine bridegroom to withdraw, to save her from destruction, God replies: 
                                                 
37 C 12.9, p. 456. 
38 C 7.9, p. 440. 
39 C 13.4, p. 459. 
40 C 13.1-2, pp. 457-458. 
41 C 13.3, pp. 458-459. 
42 C 13.3-5. 
10 
 
 Return, dove, 
 The wounded stag 
 Is in sight on the hill, 
 Cooled by the breeze of your flight.43 
The ‘wounded stag’ is a combination of scriptural metaphors, recalling the stag who longs for 
water in desire for God, from Psalm 41(42).2-3, and the swift movement of divine desire, like 
the stag who leaps on the mountains in Song 2.9.44  ‘Wounded’ carries the resonance of the 
wounds of Christ in the incarnation—this is the incarnate Christ—while the ‘wound of love’ 
from the Song of Songs is also implied, referring to the human bride’s longing for the 
bridegroom, and God’s desire for the bride.45  By means of these scriptural connotations, 
John is orchestrating a set of dramatic connections between human desire and divine desire, 
revolving around the notion of desire as a ‘wound’.  God’s appearance in the incarnation 
responds to the ‘wound’ of humanity’s suffering with Christ’s own ‘wound’.  The wounded 
stag, John says, ‘if he hears the cry of his mate and senses that she is wounded . . . 
immediately runs to comfort and coddle her.’46  It is vital to notice that the wound on both the 
divine and the human sides is not merely suffering, but desire.  The soul’s wound is the 
ecstasy of desire for God, which as we have seen is felt as unbearably painful at this stage.  
On God’s side, God’s desire for the creature means that he seeks to share in the wound of her 
suffering, to be with her.  Thus, John says, ‘the Bridegroom . . . beholding that the bride is 
wounded with love for him, he also, because of her moan, is wounded with love for her’.47  
This talk of desire as a wound brings to mind the ‘wound of love’ of the Song of Songs, 
which is not pain but the reciprocal desire of lovers.  The wound is transformed for, as John 
puts it, ‘among lovers, the wound of one is a wound for both’.48  The wound of God turns the 
pain of human desire for God into the joy of shared love.  Desire for God ceases to be 
understood as a painful lack, becoming a delightful sharing in God’s desire, in love, in which 
there is no lack.  This is union with God.  John is suggesting a major shift in the character of 
desire.  The desire changes from the solitary searching of human desire for God who seems 
                                                 
43 C 13.1, p. 458. 
44 C 12.9; 1.15. 
45 The ‘wound of love’ is introduced at C 1.14.  These scriptural metaphors for desire recall Bernard of 
Clairvaux’s Sermons on the Song of Songs, the most influential source for the interpretation of the Song of 
Songs in this period, in which they are all to be found, though John puts them in a new combination. 





absent, or at least unreachable because of the divine infinitude, to the divine desire that is 
shared between two partners who are in love.   
 
Implications for John’s understanding of desire 
It is worth reiterating the changes that have occurred to desire, in order to answer the critical 
questions more fully.  First, the antagonistic relationship between human and divine desire, 
which John has emphasised up to this point, is reversed by the meeting in the wound.  As he 
goes on to say, we experience God’s desire (the Holy Spirit) as a refreshing ‘breeze’ which 
‘cools’ our desire.49  Desire is cooled in the sense that the pathological construction of desire 
for God as implying infinite lack is removed.  ‘Rapture’ in this sense, John says, ceases: the 
soul is not torn from the body, but is ‘intercepted’ in this destructive movement by the 
movement of the Spirit from the divine side, who meets the soul in her humanity. 50  This 
allows the soul to ‘return’ to herself .51  Her desire is detached from its destructive movement 
and attached to a divine movement that replaces competition with mutuality between the 
partners.  There is still ecstatic desire on both sides, but it is newly constituted, as they move 
towards each other in a desire that unites human and divine rather than opposing them.  They 
join in the ‘breeze’ of the Holy Spirit, still as the mutual ecstasy of eros, but in a peaceful 
sharing, like the stag who finds refreshment in cool waters.52 
 
Second, God is now known within the desire, rather than as an object beyond the desire that 
desire lacks.  John says, ‘For just as love is the union of the Father and the Son, so it is the 
union of the soul with God’.53  The distinction of the soul from God is modelled on the 
distinction of Father and Son in the Trinity, in which the soul knows God from within the 
union of love, rather than by reference to an object outside it.  Thus, God is ‘seen’ when the 
wounded stag appears ‘in sight on the hill’, as soon as God’s love for the soul is experienced 
and the mutual character of the desire becomes known.54  As John says later in the Canticle, 
‘with God, to love the soul is to put her somehow in himself and make her his equal.  Thus he 
loves the soul within himself, with himself, that is with the very love with which he loves 
himself’.55  Through inclusion in divine desire, God is known not as an object outside the 
                                                 
49 C 13.11, p. 461. 
50 C 13.6. 
51 C 13.8, p. 460. 
52 C 13.9. 
53 C 13.11, p. 461; C 39.3-5. 
54 C 13.10, p. 461. 
55 C 32.6, p. 536; C 38.4. 
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desire, but from within it.  This is to develop a new epistemological capacity, in that God can 
be known primarily according to the distinction between Father and Son, not primarily from 
the distinction of creatures from God.56  The continuity between human and divine becomes 
clear, and the difference is found as an internal distinction within this continuity, putting 
continuity ahead of difference. 
 
Third, John sees this change in desire as transformative of the self.  The self is now conceived 
no longer as solitary and alienated from God, but as equal with God in love, and constituted 
by this sharing.  The transformation is evident in her dealings with the world.  The mutuality 
of desire ‘overflows’ beyond the desire for God to desire for others and for creation as a 
whole.  To desire God is now also to desire creatures, for the two desires spring from the 
same root, seeking further others with whom to share the desire.  Union, John says, 
‘overflows into the effective and actual practice of love, either interiorly with the will in the 
affective act, or exteriorly in works directed to the service of the Beloved’.57  The dynamic of 
this overflow is from the inside to the outside, first engaging the faculties of intellect, 
memory and will, reviving and filling them, so that they become ‘deep caverns of feeling’ 
(cavernas del sentido profundo), capable of ‘feeling’ (sentir), ‘possessing’ (poseer) and 
‘tasting’ (gustar) the ‘wisdom and love and communication of God’.58  The overflow then 
moves outwards, to include the sensory parts of the soul and the body too, engulfing the 
whole soul.59  Then, John says, ‘all the ability of my soul and body (memory, intellect and 
will, interior and exterior senses, appetites of the sensory and spiritual part) move in love and 
because of love’.60  The overflow continues until the whole world is seen as rooted in God, 
where ‘all things seem to move in unison’.61  Rather like Ignatius of Loyola’s goal of seeing 
God in all things, or in Gerard Manley Hopkins’ phrase, seeing the world ‘charged with the 
grandeur of God’, John treats this as the inevitable consequence of the growth of desire, 
which sees all others from within its embrace.62  It also issues in virtuous activity, because the 
‘power to look at God [from within this desire] is, for the soul, the power to do works 
[expressing the desire] in the grace of God’.63 
                                                 
56 F 4.5. 
57 C 36.4, p. 547. 
58 F 3.69, p. 637/1016. 
59 C 28.3-5. 
60 C 28.8, p. 522. 
61 F 4.4, p. 644. 
62 Ignatius of Loyola, Spiritual Exercises 235. 




What is this new desire?  Introducing the state of union in Stanza 14/15 of the Canticle, John 
says, 
Not only do her vehement yearnings and complaints of love cease, but . . . a state of 
peace and delight and gentleness of love begins in her. . . . She no longer speaks of 
sufferings and longings as she did before, but of the communion and exchange of 
sweet and peaceful love with her Beloved, because now in this state all those 
sufferings have ceased.64 
The sufferings and longings of her pathological desire cease.  The disturbances of the bodily 
appetites are subdued by this change, because the senses and the spirit have been put in order, 
bringing peace.65  The soul no longer desires further spiritual progress, for she possesses God 
with a vision that is painless.66  Her peace and rest in God are stable.67  In what sense, then, is 
the new desire still desire?  There are two problems for John to answer.  On the one hand, 
divine desire must be construed as not in need of anything, because it is perfect and complete, 
yet it is still desiring, and out of abundance rather than lack.  On the other hand, human desire 
must be transformed by divine desire without ceasing to be human, showing how lack is 
sustained on the human side while the union is defined by abundance, without contradiction. 
 
Rowan Williams fills out how John understands divine desire as abundance, with reference to 
his view of the Trinity.  A distinctive feature of John’s view of the love between the Father 
and the Son is that it is not a ‘closed mutuality’.68  The procession of the Spirit from the 
Father and the Son, and the further sending of the Son and the Spirit to creation, indicates that 
the love is not an ‘enclosed’ love between them, but is always ‘open to a further otherness’.69  
Their love does not reach a terminus in the object loved; the Father and Son not only love 
each other but, Williams says, desire the desire of the other, desiring a greater, shared desire 
that proceeds in an ‘excess’ or ‘deflection’ beyond them.  Trinitarian love is a ‘ceaseless or 
circling deflection’ in which love ‘is always directed to but never determined by a specific 
other’.70  In this sense, we can speak of desire as continuing rather than coming to an end in  
                                                 
64 C 14/15.2, p. 463. 
65 C 16.2, 9, 10. 
66 C 20/21.11. 
67 C 35.1, 4. 
68 Rowan Williams, ‘The Deflections of Desire: Negative Theology’, in Silence and the Word: Negative 
Theology and Incarnation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 115-135 (p. 118). 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., pp. 119-120 
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its object.  God desires not because God lacks anything, but because it is desire’s nature in 
God both to be shared, and through this sharing, to expand limitlessly.  Human desire 
responds, as we have seen in John’s account, by taking on the divine characteristics of 
mutuality and ‘overflow’ towards further others, without ceasing to desire.  The desire also 
shares the divine characteristic of endless expansion, in that ‘the more the soul desires God 
the more it possesses him’.71  
 
Human desire is transformed into the pattern of divine desire, but it is not identical with it.  It 
remains unlike divine desire in two respects: it is finite rather than infinite, and it is morally 
imperfect.  The lack of perfection is seen most pressingly for John in the fact that we continue 
to suffer, along with the whole of creation.  We no longer suffer from an unrequited desire for 
God, now that the desire is requited and God is seen in union, but other kinds of suffering 
continue.  This turns John to further reflection on how human lack in general is met by God 
in union.  The vital concept is that of ‘surrender’, which extends his earlier treatment of the 
‘wound’.  In love, God surrenders to the soul by choosing to join her in her suffering, to show 
his desire for her.  For the soul, this invites a reciprocal surrender, having learned that God 
desires her even in her imperfect state, and because, as we have seen, she has reached an 
impasse in her desire, in which she has ‘no remedy other than to put herself in the hands’ of 
God.72  Human imperfection is drawn into the union by this means.  It does not define the 
union, for as John continues, ‘each surrenders the entire possession of self to the other’ such 
that there is a ‘reciprocal love . . . like the marriage union and surrender, in which the goods 
of both . . . are possessed by both together’.73  The divine abundance trumps human 
imperfection.  But lack is met as lack which, John adds, makes suffering, for the soul, the 
‘means of her penetrating further’ into the ‘delectable wisdom of God . . . even to the agony 
of death in order to see God’.74  The experience of human suffering ‘even to the agony of 
death’ has become a point of access to divine desire.  On the human side, the desire continues 
to be motivated by lack, even while being more fully defined by the abundance of divine 
desire that invites this lack into it, in order to overcome it. 
 
Conclusion 
                                                 
71 F 3.23, pp. 618-619. 
72 C 9.1, p. 442. 
73 C 22.3, p. 497; F 3.79, p. 641. 
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John’s understanding of the journey of human desire in relation to God is of a gradual 
transformation through a wide variety of manifestations of desire, which reaches a crisis, 
introducing a decisive change, linked to God’s action in the incarnation, in which desire for 
God shifts from desire conceived as lack to desire as abundance.  To this extent, his account 
is a conventional Christian Neoplatonist one.  But he is distinctive in placing the mutuality of 
the lovers of the Song of Songs at the heart of his conception of divine desire, and in 
focussing the decisive change in the shift from solitary, unrequited desire to shared, 
reciprocal desire.  This is further developed by the notions of the ‘wound’ and ‘surrender’ as 
showing how human weakness and suffering are positively invited into this union and 
included in it.  Yet the continuity between human and divine desire also comes to outweigh 
their antagonism: John is optimistic about the transformation of human desire into the 
likeness of divine desire, taking on divine characteristics.  God can be known from within the 
desire, in the manner of the Father and Son in the Trinity, rather than as a quasi-creaturely, 
external object; the same desire points to God’s presence in all human relations, making God 
available in the world; and there is satisfaction in the continuation of the desire without end, 
which detaches the pain of lack from human growth.  
